How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Lorenzo, Leticia
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How to apply penalties to avoid delays in
projects
Gustavo Bergantin˜os and Leticia Lorenzo
Universidade de Vigo
25 January 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91718/
MPRA Paper No. 91718, posted 4 February 2019 15:49 UTC
How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects∗
Gustavo Bergantiños, Universidade de Vigo.
Leticia Lorenzo, Universidade de Vigo
Abstract
A planner wants to carry out a project involving several firms. In many
cases the planner, for instance the Spanish Administration, includes in the
contract a penalty clause that imposes a payment per day if the firms do
not complete their activities or the project on time. We discuss two ways of
including such penalty clauses in contracts. In the first the penalty applies
only when the whole project is delayed. In the second the penalty applies to
each firm that incurs a delay even if the project is completed on time. We
compare the two penalty systems and find that the optimal penalty (for the
planner) is larger in the second method, the utility of the planner is always
at least as large or larger in the second case and the utility of the firms is
always at least as large or larger in the first. Surprisingly, the final delay in
the project is unrelated to which penalty system is chosen.
Keywords: game theory; PERT; delays; penalties
1 Introduction
Assume that an agent, which we will call the planner, wants to carry out a project.
The planner could be a public or private organization and the project could be the
construction of some kind of infrastructure such as a bridge or a building. Typically,
the project involves diﬀerent activities that might be performed by diﬀerent firms.
Thus, the planner allocates each activity to a diﬀerent firm. Each firm becomes
responsible for performing its activity in a specified time. The planner wants to
carry out the project by a deadline and will suﬀer a cost if the deadline is not met.
∗The authors are partially supported by research grants ECO2014-52616-R and ECO2015-70119-
REDT from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Competitiveness, GRC 2015/014 from "Xunta de
Galicia", and 19320/PI/14 from “Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia”.
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We consider that the firms responsible for the activities are not aﬀected directly
by the cost suﬀered by the planner if the project is delayed. For instance, consider
that the planner is a private firm that wants to adapt a warehouse to install a new
data server and one of the activities of the project is the electrical installation. If
that installation is delayed the server cannot work. This delay in the set-up of the
server directly aﬀects the planner, but it does not aﬀect the firm responsible for the
electrical installation. Thus, the planner should do something to encourage firms to
complete their activities in the agreed time. In practice, the usual way is to impose
a penalty on firms that cause a delay. This point is included in the contract between
the planner and the firm in such a way that when there is a delay caused by the firm
the amount received by the firm decreases in proportion to the delay in the activity.
When the planner is a private organization contracts between the planner and
firms are private. Thus, it is diﬃcult to know how penalty clauses (if any) are
described in them. But when the planner is a public organization it is possible
to learn that information. For instance, Spanish law sets a general framework for
contracts in the public sector1. One part of that general legislation2 describes how
penalties should be applied to firms that cause a delay. The main issues in this area
of Spanish law are outlined below.
First, any project must have a deadline. Firms must complete the project by that
deadline. The administration can also stipulate interim deadlines in some contracts,
in which case the firms must also meet those interim deadlines.
Second, if firms suﬀer delays (in meeting the project or interim deadlines) for
which they are responsible, then the administration can cancel the contract or impose
penalties on them. The general penalty is applied on a daily basis in a proportion of
0.2 per 1000 of the total cost estimate for the project. However, the administra-
tion can include diﬀerent penalties in some contracts. Whenever the penalty reaches
a multiple of 5% of the total cost estimated of the project, the administration must
decide between canceling the project or continuing to apply the penalties.
Third, penalties must be applied by deducting them from the total amount that
the firm is to receive from the administration.
In this paper we present a formal model for analyzing situations of this kind.
1We are talking about the “Real Decreto Legislativo 3/2011, de 14 de noviembre, por el que se
aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Contratos del Sector Público”. Ministerio de Economía y
Hacienda.
BOE number 276. Date: November 16th, 2011. Reference BOE-A-2011-17887
2LIBRO IV: Efectos, cumplimiento y extinción de los contratos administrativos
TÍTULO I: Normas Generales
CAPÍTULO III: Ejecución de los contratos
Artículo 212: Ejecución defectuosa y demora
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Our model is inspired by Spanish law, but it could be applied to a wide class of
situations including administrations in other countries. For example, in February
2015 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development updated the General
Conditions for Construction Contracts -Public Housing Programs (Chicago Housing
Authority, 2015). Among these conditions there is a liquidated damages clause that
states: “If the Contractor fails to complete the work within the time specified in
the contract, or any extension, [...] the Contractor shall pay to the Public Housing
Agency as liquidated damages, the sum of $........[Contracting Oﬃcer insert amount]
for each day of delay. If diﬀerent completion dates are specified in the contract for
separate parts or stages of the work, the amount of liquidated damages shall be
assessed on those parts or stages which are delayed.” There are also other clauses
concerning the right of the Public Housing Agency to terminate the Contractor’s
right to proceed with the work due to an excessive delay. This issue has also been
studied in other countries such as Italy, Kuwait and the Republic of the Congo (see,
D’Alpaos   (2009), Al-Tabtabai   (1998), and Louzolo-Kimbembe and Mbani
(2013)).
This model could also be applied to the private sector. For example, in its Guide
for Supplementary Conditions the American Institute of Architects suggests includ-
ing a liquidated damages clause in construction contracts in the following terms:
“9.11 The Contractor and the Contractor’s surety, if any, shall be liable for and shall
pay the Owner the sums hereinafter stipulated as liquidated damages, and not as
a penalty, for each calendar day of delay after the date established for Substantial
Completion in the Contract Documents until the Work is substantially complete”
(AIA Document A503-2007).
In this paper the PERT (Project Evaluation Review Technique) is used to model
projects. Non-cooperative games in extensive form are used for modeling the situa-
tions faced by the diﬀerent agents involved in the project.
In our model we have two kinds of agent: the planner, who wants to complete
a project, and the firms, which are hired by the planner to complete the various
activities involved in the project. Typically, the planner is a public or a private
institution. Our non-cooperative game has three stages.
Stage 1. The planner decides what penalty will be applied to firms in case of
delay. We assume that the penalty is proportional to the delay.
Stage 2. Following the structure of the project, firms decide how much eﬀort they
will devote to their assigned activities. Since we are studying situations in which firms
are responsible for their delays, we assume that they can complete their allocated
activities within the specified time if they devote the resources at their disposal.
Thus, a delay in activity results from devoting fewer resources than required. We
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also assume that firms can obtain profit from devoting part of their resources to
activities unrelated to the project. Thus, firms must find a balance between the
utility that they obtain by devoting their resources to outside jobs and the penalty
that will be imposed on them by the planner.
Stage 3. The planner pays the firms. We assume that the planner receives
a utility from the completion of the project. Once the project is completed the
planner knows what delays there have been in all activities. Each firm receives the
amount agreed for the completion of its activity, minus the penalties applied for
delays in that activity (if any). As in Spanish law, we consider two ways of applying
penalties: First, only when the whole project is delayed, i.e. if a particular activity
is delayed but the whole project is completed on time the planner does not apply
the penalty. Second, the planner applies the penalty to each firm whose allocated
activity is delayed (regardless of whether or not the whole project is delayed).
Actually, we consider two non-cooperative games in which Stages 1 and 2 are the
same but Stage 3 is diﬀerent. Since the utility of the agents is diﬀerent in the two
games, the equilibria could be diﬀerent. In this paper we study and compare the
equilibria in the two cases. Our main findings are the following.
The optimal penalty for the planner depends on the profit obtained by the firms
when devoting their resources to activities other than the project. Thus, under Span-
ish law it is better to set the penalty depending on the project under consideration
than to apply the general penalty. Moreover, the amount of the penalty also depends
on how it is applied (when the whole project is delayed or always), which is not the
case here.
For each project, the utility of each firm when penalties are applied only when
the whole project is delayed is as great or greater than its utility when penalties are
always applied. By contrast, the utility of the planner when penalties are always
applied is as great or greater than its utility when penalties are applied only when
the whole project is delayed.
The delay of the project is unrelated. Sometimes is greater when penalties are
applied only when the whole project is delayed. Sometimes is greater when penalties
are always applied. Assume that there is a set of agents (other than the planner
and the firms) that need the project to be completed. For instance the project could
be the construction of a new hospital, highway, etc. Those agents clearly want the
project to be completed as soon as possible, but in such a situation it is not clear
which penalty system is better.
The paper is organized as follows. The next subsection briefly reviews the lit-
erature related to our paper. Section 2 describes in detail the situations that we
study. Section 3 analyzes the case where the planner applies the penalties only when
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the whole project is delayed. Section 4 analyzes the other case, where penalties are
always applied. Section 5 compares the results obtained in the two cases. Finally,
we present some concluding remarks.
1.1 Literature review
As far as we know there are not many papers studying how to manage delays in
projects when several activities are involved. In the literature on civil engineering,
a field in which the contract is cancelled in some countries if the total amount of
penalties becomes very high, there are some papers that seek to find the limit for
penalties so that the cancellation date does not exceed the due date of the project.
Cases in point are the papers by Al-Tabtabai   (1998), D’Alpaos   (2009) and
Louzolo-Kimbembe and Mbani (2013).
Focusing on economic literature, there is typically assumed to be a delay in the
project caused by delays in several activities. This delay generates a cost that has to
be paid by those responsible for the activities that cause the delay. The main question
addressed in this literature is how this cost should be divided fairly between those
responsible for these activities.
Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002) propose two rules: The first is based on cost
sharing literature. They associate a cost sharing problem as in Moulin and Shenker
(1992) with each project with delays. Then they study the serial cost sharing rule
of that cost sharing problem. The second rule is based on cooperative games: They
associate a cooperative game with each project with delays, then study the Shapley
value (Shapley (1953)) of that game.
Branzêi   (2002) propose several rules following two diﬀerent approaches. In
the first approach they associate a bankruptcy problem with each project with delays
(see, for instance Aumann and Maschler (1985) or the survey by Thomson (2003)).
Then they compute various bankruptcy rules. In the second approach they introduce
more rules defined directly from the project with delays.
Estévez-Fernández   (2007) associate a new cooperative game with each
project with delays. The core of that cooperative game is studied.
Estévez-Fernández (2012) considers a more general model than in Estévez-Fernández
  (2007). For instance, the cost function of this paper is more general. A cooper-
ative game (diﬀerent from the one considered in Estévez-Fernández   (2007)) is
associated with each project with delays. The core of that new cooperative game is
studied. For instance, it is proved that the core is non empty.
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Although our paper also studies projects with delays, the approach taken is quite
diﬀerent from the papers mentioned above, which attempt to divide the cost fairly
between the activities by means of the Shapley value, the serial cost sharing rule,
bankruptcy rules or the core. Here, we seek to study mechanisms incentivizing firms
to behave in the “right” way. The literature on implementation addresses the same
objective as we do. The idea of that literature is to provide a mechanism (formally, a
non-cooperative game) such that when agents which behave only out of self-interest
play the mechanism optimally (formally, they play some kind of equilibria) the final
outcome is good from a social welfare perspective. Some examples of this literature
are Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) and Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). These
papers study two mechanisms whose equilibria induce the Shapley value. O’Neill
(1982) and Dagan   (1997) study two mechanisms whose equilibria induce some
bankruptcy rules. Moulin and Shenker (1992) study a mechanism whose equilibria
induce the serial cost sharing rule. Perry and Reny (1994) study a mechanism whose
equilibria induce elements of the core.
2 The situations studied
There is a planner (denoted by 0), who wishes to carry out a project involving
several activities that must be completed in a specific order. Some activities can be
performed concurrently while others must be performed sequentially. Each activity
is allocated to a diﬀerent firm, which is responsible for completing it.
Each activity has an estimated duration representing the time needed to complete
the activity when the firm devotes all its resources to it. Each firm has agreed with
the planner to complete its activity in the allotted time. The planner has agreed
with each firm on the amount that each firm will receive for completing its activity
on time. The planner obtains a benefit from the completion of the project.
The planner wants to finish the project as soon as possible, given the duration
of the activities. If the project is delayed the planner suﬀers a cost which is linear
over the total delay in the project. The firms responsible for the activities are not
aﬀected directly if the project is delayed.
The firms can act strategically by assigning some of their resources to other tasks
unrelated to the project and thus obtaining extra earnings. In this case they will
need more time to complete their activities in the project. For example, assume that
a firm is working on the construction of a house with a crew of ten workers and
its allocated activity has an eight-week deadline. In this case the workers are the
resources of the firm. The roof of a warehouse is broken and needs to be repaired
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quickly. If the firm does not take this job now it will lose it. Thus, the firm assigns
five members of the crew to the job of mending the roof for two weeks. The other
five continue to work on the construction of the house. Once the roof is fixed the
five workers return to the house. Since the firm needs a crew of ten workers working
for 8 weeks to complete its activity on time, it will now finish it in 9 weeks3.
We assume that the planner cannot observe how much of their resources firms
devote to their activities. The planner only observes the real completion time of the
activity, denoted by 0 (we assume that 0 ≥ ). In the above example the planner
observes that the firm completes the activity in nine weeks.
In order to avoid strategic behavior by firms, the planner punishes them if they
delay their activities. Before the projects starts, the planner announces a penalty 
per unit of delay that firms must pay. We consider two cases.
1. First, the planner will punish firms that delay their activities only when the
whole project is delayed.
If the project is completed on time each firm  receives , even if its activity
was delayed.
If the whole project is delayed, each firm  receives  − (0 − ).
2. Second, penalties are imposed for all activities that are delayed. In this case
each firm  receives  − (0 − ).
We assume that each firm  has a reserve utility  representing the utility per
unit of time that firm  obtains from reassigning all its resources to an alternative
task unrelated to the project. Thus, if firm  is not punished it obtains  + ∗
where ∗ is the number of units of time for which its resources have been assigned to
an alternative task. If it is punished, it obtains  + ∗ −  (0 − ).
In the above example ∗ = 1 because the firm assigns five workers during two
weeks, or equivalently ten workers for 1 week. Notice that, in general, ∗ coincides
with 0 −  (in our case 9− 8).
We define the delay  of firm  as 0 − . Thus, the previous expressions can be
written with  instead of ∗ and 0 − .
3Note that only five workers are working on the activity for the first two weeks, which means
that they do the same amount of work as 10 workers working for one week. In weeks 3 to 9 the full
crew is working on the house.
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Remark 1 In order to simplify the notation of the paper we assume that firms decide
how long to delay the activity rather than how much of their resources and time they
will devote to other tasks. Moreover, when no confusion arises we identify the firm
with its allocated activity.
We now introduce other notation used in the paper. Given  = ()∈ and
 = ()∈ we say that  Pareto dominates  if  ≥  for all  ∈  and there exists
 ∈  such that   . Given a subset ⊂  we denote by  = ()∈ . Given
a subset  ⊂ R we define the Pareto boundary of  as
() = { ∈  : there is no  ∈  such that  Pareto dominates }
The procedure described above is modeled as a non-cooperative game in extensive
form. We use the PERT for modeling the project considered.
2.1 Modeling the project: The PERT
The PERT (Project Evaluation and Review Technique) is a well known tool of Oper-
ations Research for managing complex projects where several activities are involved.
A classical reference for PERT is Moder and Phillips (1970). In the PERT model
there is a directed graph  where the arcs are the activities and the nodes denote
the end or the beginning of one or more activities. We denote the set of arcs by
 = {1 2     }. For each  ∈  ,  and  denote the beginning and the ending
node of  respectively. There are two special nodes: node origin, which is the unique
node such that there is no activity ending at that node, and node end, which is the
unique node such that there is no activity beginning at that node. Each activity 
has an estimated duration of  units of time, planned in an initial schedule.
A path  is a set of consecutive activities from the origin to the end of the project.
We denote by Π the set of all paths in . The duration of a path  ∈ Π is the sum
of the durations of the activities along this path, i.e.  = P
∈
. The PERT time
 is the minimum time needed to complete the project. Thus,  is the duration of
the longest path, namely  = max∈Π . The slack of a path , denoted by , is the
amount of time the activities in the path can delay without delaying the project.
Thus,  =  − . The slack of an activity , denoted by , is the maximum time
the activity can delay without delaying the project. Thus,  = min∈Π:∈ . A path
or an activity is critical if its slack is 0. This means that any delay will produce a
delay in the project.
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Given two activities   ∈  we say that  comes before , and denote it by  ≺ ,
if activity  needs to be performed before activity  can begin. Given an activity
 ∈  and a path  ∈ Π such that  ∈ , we denote by ( ) the set of activities
that precede  in the path . Analogously, we denote by ( ) the set of activities
that follow  in . Formally:
( ) = { ∈  :  ≺ } and
( ) = { ∈  :  ≺ }
We denote by () the set of activities that need to be performed before ac-
tivity  can begin and () denotes the set of activities that need activity  to be
performed before they can start. Formally:
() = [
∈Π:∈
( )
() = [
∈Π:∈
( )
3 First case: penalties only when the project is
delayed
Wemodel this situation with a non-cooperative game in extensive form with 3 stages.
In the first stage the planner decides the penalty per unit of delay to be paid by firms
when the project is delayed. In the second stage the firms decide how much of their
resources to put on their activities. The greater the resources the shorter the delay.
In the third stage the planner pays the firms and applies the penalties, if any.
As argued in Remark 1, in Stage 2 each firm decides how long to delay its activity.
As laid down in Spanish and US law, if a project is delayed the planner (public
institution) has the right to cancel the contract or to impose a penalty. Typically,
if the delay is short the planner imposes a penalty but if it is long it cancels the
contract. Thus, we assume that there is a maximum level of delay, say , such that
if the firm delays more than  the planner will cancel the contract with the firm.
Thus, the firm will not receive the payment . Hence,  ∈ [0]. Note that under
this assumption the project will not be canceled, so we focus on the case where the
project is always completed.
The firms make their decisions following the structure of the project. This issue
can be explained via the following example.
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Example 1 Consider the project given by the following picture.
where
activities   
 3 5 0
 1 5 2
 1 5 2
Stage 1. The planner announces the penalty  to all the firms involved in the
project.
Stage 2. Firms  and  decide simultaneously how long to delay their activities.
Once firm  has finished, firm  decides its delay. Depending on the decisions of
firms  and  firm  could make its decision after  or simultaneously with . Assume
that  = 0 and  = 1, so firm  decides at time 2, while firm  is still working.
Nevertheless, if  = 0 and  = 3, then firm  finishes at time 3 and firm  at time
4. Hence firm  decides its delay at time 4 when firm  has already finished.
In general, if activity  ∈ (), firm  decides after firm  has finished. If
 ∈ () and  ∈ () anything is possible:  decides after  has finished,
 decides after  has finished, or one of them decides while the other one is still
working.
It is important to state what information is available to a firm when the time
comes to decide its delay. We assume that each firm knows at time , when it has
to make its decision, which firms have already finished, and what their delays are.
Thus, the information set of a firm  is characterized by a triple (  ) where 
is the time at which it has to start. Thus, all activities preceding  have already
finished, i.e.
 ∈
⎡
⎣ max∈Π:∈
X
∈()
 max∈Π:∈
X
∈()
( +)
⎤
⎦ ,
 is the set of activities that have been completed by time , namely
 =
⎧
⎨
⎩ ∈  : max∈Π:∈
X
∈()∪{}
( + ) ≤ 
⎫
⎬
⎭ 
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and  = ()∈ where  is the delay of each activity  ∈ .
Given a firm  ∈  , a strategy for firm  is a map  that assigns to each
information set (  ) a delay  (  ) ∈ [0]. When no confusion arises
we write  instead of  (  ). Besides, we usually write  instead of (  ).
Given a strategy profile  = ()∈ and a path  ∈ Π, we denote by () the real
duration of the path  when the delays of the activities are given by . Analogously,
we denote by  () the real duration of the project. Thus,
 () = max∈Π () = max∈Π
X
∈
( + )
In this expression  stands also for the real delay of activity  when firms play
according with with the strategy profile  When no confusion arises, we will make
the same abuse of notation in the rest of the paper.
Remark 2 We assume that  ()   . Namely, if all activities are delayed as long
as possible then the project will be delayed for sure.
We now describe Stage 3, where the planner pays the firms.
• The firms. The utility obtained by firm  will be the amount received from the
planner, plus the utility the firm obtains from the alternative tasks, minus the
penalty caused by its delay (if the whole project is delayed). Formally,
( ) =
½  +  if  () ≤ 
 +  −  if  ()  
• Planner. The utility of the planner will be the benefits obtained from the
completion of the project, plus (if the project is delayed) the amount obtained
from the penalties minus the cost associated with the delay.
0( ) =
( 0 if  () ≤ 
0 + P
∈
 − ( ()−  ) if  ()  
Remark 3 The utility function can be simplified. Since we are assuming that the
project is completed, the planner always obtains 0 and each firm  always receives
. Thus, the utility function can be defined in terms of earnings with respect to the
status quo ()∈∪0.
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We now present the formal definition of the non-cooperative PERT game taking
into account the above comments.
A PERT problem with delays is a triple (  ) where  is the graph asso-
ciated with the PERT problem,  is the cost per unit of time that the planner will
incur if the project is delayed, and  = ()∈ is the vector of reserve utilities of the
firms.
We can associate a non-cooperative game Γ(  ) with each PERT problem
with delays as above, where:
1. Stage 1. The planner decides the penalty  ∈ [0+∞).
2. Stage 2. The firms, following the structure of the project, decide the vector
of delays  = ()∈ .
3. Stage 3. The planner pays the firms. Because of Remark 3 the utilities are:
( ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if  = 0 and  () ≤ 
 if  ∈  and  () ≤ P
∈
 − ( ()−  ) if  = 0 and  ()  
( − )  if  ∈  and  ()  
Assume that in Example 1,  = 3  = 0  = 1 and  = 2. Besides, agents
play the following strategies  = 1  = 0  = 5 and  = 1. There are two paths
from the origin to the end: {} and { }. The real duration of the paths when
agents play ( ) are {}() = 3 and {}() = 8. Thus, the real duration of the
project according with ( ) is  () = max {3 8} = 8. Namely, the project has been
delayed because  = 3. Then,
0( ) = 1 (5 + 1)− 3 (8− 3) = −9
( ) = 0
( ) = (1− 1)5 = 0
( ) = (2− 1) 2 = 2
Since  = , firm  obtains the same utility delaying its activity 5 units than
finishing on time.
Remark 4 Assume that  =  for some firm  ∈  . Assume that the whole project
is delayed. This means that firm  will obtain zero whatever its delay. We assume
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that in such cases, firm  prefers not to delay. This can be interpreted as a reputation
eﬀect. Planners do not like delays and if a firm does not produce delays its reputation
will be better and it will be easier for it to obtain contracts in the future. Thus, we
consider that a firm will cause a delay only if it improves its utility by doing so.
Next we study our model in three diﬀerent examples: in the first all the activities
perform in line; in the second all the activities perform in parallel; and in the third
we propose a mixture of the two cases (a slight modification of Example 1).
Example 2 Consider a project where all the activities are in line.
Since the unique path is the critical one, a delay in one activity will turn into a
delay in the whole project. For each  and each  ∈  , the utility of firm  will be 0
if it has not delayed and ( − )  if it has delayed . Thus, in any Nash equilibria
() of the game if   , firm  chooses  = 0. If   , firm  chooses  = .
If  = , by Remark 4, firm  chooses  = 0.
Thus, for each  the utility of the planner will be (− ) P
∈ :
. So in an 
the planner chooses the penalty  that maximizes the above expression. If  ≥ , the
planner will always obtain a non negative utility. If the reserve utilities are not so
small (for instance    for some ) then the planner will choose  ≥ .
This example shows that in equilibrium the planner could possibly choose a
penalty greater than the cost, which is quite intuitive. Nevertheless, it is also pos-
sible that in equilibrium the project could be delayed. This is not counterintuitive.
Assume that the cost  of delaying the project is smaller than the reserve utilities of
the firms and the planner chooses a penalty  larger than  but smaller that some
. Thus, firms will decide to delay their activities because the benefits exceed the
penalty. But the planner will also get benefits because the money obtained from the
penalties oﬀsets the loss caused by the delay.
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Example 3 Consider a project where the three activities are performed in parallel.
Besides  = 2 and
activities   
 3 10 1
 3 10 1
 3 10 1
Note that, as in the example above, all activities are critical. Thus, if a firm
delays its activity then the whole project will be delayed.
Assume that agents are playing an . If the planner announces a penalty  ≥ 1,
all the activities will be completed on time and the payoﬀ for the planner will be 0.
If the planner announces  = 09 all the firms will choose  =  = 10. Thus, the
payoﬀ of the planner will be 3 · 09 · 10− 2 · 10 = 7  0.
Next, we consider an example where some activities are performed in parallel and
others in sequence.
Example 4 Consider the project given by the figure in Example 1 where  = 5 and
activities   
a 10 5 0
b 4 5 3
e 4 5 3
If firms play an  in the subgame obtained in Stage 2, depending on , we can
obtain several 4
 4 25 2
(  ) (0 2 0) (0 1 1) (0 5 5)
 ()−  0 0 8
(0   ) (0 0 6 0) (0 0 3 3) (−20 0 5 5)
4This statement is a consequence of our results but could be proved now directly.
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In the case  = 4 it is easy to see that the  obtained in Stage 2 is unique.
Nevertheless, in the case  = 25 several  could exist in the subgame obtained
in Stage 2. For instance (  ) = (0 09 11) is also an  inducing no delay
in the project ( ()−  = 0) and whose payoﬀ vector is (0 0 27 33). Notice that,
even the payoﬀ of the firms is diﬀerent in both cases, the project is not delayed and
so the utility of the planner is the same. Intuitively, what is happening is that firms
 and  are dividing the slack of path {} among them in diﬀerent ways. In the case
 = 2 the  obtained in Stage 2 is also unique.
3.1 Equilibria in Stage 2
In this part we characterize the  of the subgame of Γ(  ) obtained in Stage
2, once the penalty  is announced by the planner. First we introduce some concepts
used in this characterization.
Given a penalty  and a firm  with   , if firm  delays  its utility will be
at least (− )  0. If  ≤  and firm  does not delay its activity, its utility will
certainly be 0. Thus, we define the minimal right utility5 of firm  as
 () =
⎧
⎨
⎩
( − ) if   
0 if  ≤ 
Remark 5 This minimal right utility can also be interpreted as maxmin utility.
Namely, for each penalty  and each firm  we define
 () = max min−  (  −)
where − stands for the strategies of the agents in  \ {}.
For each  ∈  , it is easy to see that when the delay of the other firms is enough
to delay the project, namely  ¡0 \{}¢   , the minimal right utility and the
maxmin utility coincide ( () =  ()).
5The name minimal right is used in reference to the structure of the non-cooperative game, but
not the contract between the planner and the firm.
15
Given a penalty , let () be theminimal right delay, i.e. the minimum time
by which activity  should be delayed when the project is not delayed to obtain its
minimal right utility. Thus,
() =
⎧
⎨
⎩
( − )
 if   
0 if  ≤ 
Notice that () ∈ [0 ] always. When no confusion arises we will write 
instead of ().
Given a penalty  ∈ R such that P
∈
() ≤  for all  ∈  , let  () be the set
of delays of the activities such that each agent delays at least () units of time and
the project finishes on time. Namely,
 () =
(
 ∈ R :  ∈ [()] and
X
∈
 ≤  for all  ∈ 
)

In the next proposition we characterize the  in the subgame obtained in Stage
2.
Proposition 1 Let Γ(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by the PERT
problem with delays (  ) Let  be the penalty chosen by the planner at Stage
1. Assume that firms are playing an  in the subgame obtained in Stage 2.
(1) If there exists a path 0 ∈ Π such that P
∈0
()  0, then all  have the
same utility outcome. Besides, the project is delayed under any .
(2) If
P
∈
() ≤  for all  ∈ Π, then any allocation in ©()∈ :  ∈ ( ())ª
can be obtained as the utility vector associated with some . Thus, there exist equi-
libria in which the project is not delayed.
Proof of Proposition 1.
(1) We prove that there exists an  with delay. Let us define the strategy
profile  where for each  ∈  and each information set ,
() =
½
0 if  ≤ 
 if   
Since 0  P
∈0
() ≤ P
∈0:
 = P
∈0
, the project is delayed under .
Next we prove that  is an . Consider  ∈  and 0 a strategy of agent . We
distinguish two cases:
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1.   . Assume that ( 0 −) 6= ( ) Then, there exists an information
set  of agent  which is achieved under (0 −) such that 0()  . So,
( 0 −) =
½ 0() if  (0 −) ≤ 
( − )0() if  (0 −)  
If  (0 −)   then ( − )0()  ( − ) = ( ).
Assume that  (0 −) ≤  Since P∈0 ()  0,  ∈ 0 andX
∈0\{}:
 + 0() ≤ 0 
Since () ≤  for each  ∈ 0\{} with    () = 0 for each  ∈ 0\{}
with  ≤  and P
∈0
()  0 we deduce that 0()  () So, 0() 
() = ( − ) = ( ).
2.  ≤ . Since () = 0 for any information set , the project will be delayed
under (0 −). Thus,
( 0 −) = ( − )0() ≤ 0 = ( )
Next we prove that the project is delayed under any . Assume there exists
an   = ()∈ where the project finishes on time. Thus, P
∈
 ≤  for each
 ∈  . Since P
∈0
()  0, there exists an agent  ∈ 0 such that ()   ≥ 0.
Since ()  0, we have that   . Let 0 be such that 0() =  for each
information set  of agent . If firm  deviates and plays 0 instead of  then
( 0 −) =
½  if  (0 −) ≤ 
( − ) if  (0 −)  
Thus, ( 0 −) ≥ ( − ) =  ()  . Since agent  improves by
playing 0 instead of ,  is not a  which is a contradiction. Thus, under an, the project will be delayed.
Finally we prove that the utility outcome associated with any  is unique.
Let 0 be an . We identify 0 with the choice of firm  in the information set
achieved when all agents play 0 We have proved that the project is delayed. Thus,
 ( ) = ( − ) 0 If    then 0 = 0 (otherwise agent  improves by playing
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0 instead of 0). If  = 0 or  = , then ( ) = 0 for each 0. By Remark 4,0 = 0. If   , then 0 =  (otherwise agent  improves by playing  instead of0). Notice that the outcome associated with 0 coincides with the outcome of the defined at the beginning of the proof. Thus, the utility outcome of the set of
 is unique.
(2) Given  ∈ ( ()), we define  such that for each  ∈  and each infor-
mation set , () = . Note that under , firms allocate the slack in the paths
according to . Besides, the conditions over  guarantee the project finishes on time.
Thus, ( ) =  for each  ∈  .
We prove that  is an . Assume firm  changes its strategy to 0. We identify0 with the choice of firm  in the information set achieved when all agents play
according to (0 −). We distinguish two cases:
1. 0  . The project finishes on time and
 ( 0 −) = 0   = ( )
2. 0  . Since  ∈ ( ()) and 0 ∈ [()], there exist  ∈  such thatP
∈\{}
 + 0  . Thus, the project will be delayed and  ( 0 −) =
( − )0. We distinguish two cases:
(a)  ≤ . In this case
 ( 0 −) = ( − )0 ≤ 0 ≤ ( )
(b)   . In this case
 ( 0 −) = ( − )0 ≤ ( − ) = () ≤  = ( )¥
In the first part of Proposition 1 we prove that, basically, we have a unique .
Nevertheless, in the second part we identify a subset of utility allocations associated
with . Depending on the case there may be  where the project is delayed or
not. For instance, when   max∈ , there is no  where the project is delayed.
However, in the next example, we show there are  that lead to payoﬀs that are
not associated with any allocation  ∈ ( ()).
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Example 5 . Consider the project given by the following figure
where
Activities   
 10 3 0
 2 3 3
 2 3 3
 2 8 4
Notice that the value of  is irrelevant for our analysis. Let  = 2 We define 
as follows
• () = 0 for every information set .
• () = 1 for every information set .
• () = 2 for every information set .
• () =
½
4 if  = 4  = { }  = 1 and  = 2
8 otherwise.
Thus, ( ) = 0 ( ) = 3  ( ) = 6 and ( ) = 16 Note that under
this strategy the slack of path { } is not completely allocated. It is easy to prove
that  is a  For instance, if firm  delays 2, instead of 1, the project still finishes
on time. But if firm  does so, firm  will delay 8 (instead of 4), the project will be
delayed and the utility of firm  will be 2.
Nevertheless, the vector of delays (0 1 2 4) associated with , does not belong to
( (2)) because (0 2 2 4) Pareto dominates (0 1 2 4) and (0 2 2 4) ∈  (2).
In the next Proposition we characterize the set of  whose payoﬀs for the firms
are not Pareto dominated by other . By part 1 of Proposition 1, when there is
a path 0 ∈ Π such that P
∈0
()  0 all  have the same utility outcome. In
such a case the set of  whose payoﬀs are not Pareto dominated is the set of all
.
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Proposition 2 Let Γ(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by (  ) As-
sume that
P
∈
() ≤  for all  ∈ Π. Let  be an  in the subgame obtained in
Stage 2. Then, the set of  whose payoﬀs are not Pareto dominated is:
{()∈ :  ∈ ( ())} 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let  be an  where the project is delayed. By part
2 of Proposition 1 we know that there exist  where the project is not delayed.
Let 0 be one of such  Let us denote by  and 0 the vectors of utilities for the
firms associated with both equilibria respectively. Using arguments similar to those
used in the proof of part 1 of Proposition 1 we can deduce that for each  ∈ 
 =
½
0 if  ≤ 
( − ) if   
Besides, 0 = ()∈ where  ∈ ( ()) We now prove that  ≤ 0 for all ∈  If  = 0 then it is obvious because  ≥ 0 and  ≥  ≥ 0. If  = (− ),
then  = ( − ) ≤  ≤  = 0.
Note that there exists at least one agent  such that  6= 0. Otherwise both
vectors would coincide and, by Remark 4, an agent will choose the strategy that
leads to a smaller delay. Thus, 0 Pareto dominates .
Let  be an undominated. Since the project ends on time under , the utilities
for the firms under  can be rewritten as ()∈ where  ∈ [0] andP
∈
 ≤ .
When we define  we have argued that any firm  can obtain, independently of the
strategies of the other agents, a utility . Thus,  ≥  for all  ∈  . Hence
 ∈  (). Suppose that  ∈ ( ()). Then there exists 0 ∈  () such that
0 Pareto dominates . We can assume 0 ∈ ( ()) (otherwise we can consider
00 ∈ ( ()) such that 00 Pareto dominates 0 and proceed with 00 instead of 0).
Under Proposition 1.2, the allocation (0)∈ can be obtained as the utility vector
associated with some  0. Thus, the vector of utilities associated with the  0
Pareto dominates the vector of utilities associated with  , contradicting that 
is an undominated . Thus, we conclude that  ∈ ( ()).
It only remains to prove that if  is an  whose vector of utilities is given
by ()∈ with  ∈ ( ()), then  is an undominated . Suppose not.
Then, there exists another  0 such that the utilities associated with 0 Pareto
dominates ()∈ . We can assume that 0 is an undominated  (otherwise
we take 00 an undominated  that Pareto dominates 0 and we proceed with 00
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instead of 0). The utility vector associated with 0 can be expressed as (0)∈
with 0 ∈ ( ()). Thus, 0 ≥  for all  ∈  . If  = 0 then 0 =  = 0
by Remark 4. Then 0 ≥  for each  ∈  with   0 and there exists  ∈  with  0 such that 0   Thus, 0 Pareto dominates , which is a contradiction. ¥
We end this subsection with some examples showing that some  might not
be a good prediction of the behavior of firms.
Example 6 Consider the project given by Example 3 where  = 5 and
activities   
 3 5 0
 2 5 1
 2 5 1
Assume that  = 09. Notice that the three firms take their decisions simultane-
ously. Thus, they have only one information set. Since  = 0 and  is a critical
activity it is a dominant strategy for firm  to finish on time. Thus, if  is an 
in the subgame in Stage 2 then  = 0.
There are two  in the subgame in Stage 2  = (0 1 1) and 0 = (0 5 5). In
the first  firms  and  delay by 1 unit, the project finishes on time, and each
firm ( and ) obtains 1. In the second  firms  and  delay as long as possible,
the project is delayed and each firm ( and ) obtains (1− 09) 5 = 05. Notice that
the second  is Pareto dominated, in terms of the utilities of the firms, by the first
one.
The second  is based on a bad coordination eﬀect. Firm  (or ) thinks that
firm  (or ) will delay as long as possible, so its best option is to do likewise.
Nevertheless, it is better for both firms to delay by only 1 unit (as the first 
suggests).
This bad coordination eﬀect is intrinsic to the  when agents play simultane-
ously. We believe that in this example the first  predicts the behavior of rational
firms better.
Example 7 Assume that in Example 1  = 19. Thus () = () = 025. Because
of Proposition 2, the set of utilities associated with undominated  is
{(0  2− ) :  ∈ [05 15]} 
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Take (0 06 14). This corresponds to  = 0,  = 03, and () = 07 for any
information set  of firm . We do not believe that this  predicts the behavior of
rational firms.
We now analyze this example in detail. Firms  and  must make their decisions
simultaneously and the only information that they have is  = 19. Firm  knows
the delay of firm . Firm  may know the delay of firm  (for instance if  = 4
and  = 0) but it also may not (for instance if  = 1 and  = 0). What should
firm  do in any of its information sets? Of course, if the project is delayed the best
decision for firm  is to play  = 5(= ). We consider several cases:
1. Assume that   1, then the project will be delayed. Hence, the best decision
for firm  is  = 5 and its final payoﬀ will be (2− 19) 5 = 05.
2. Assume that 075   ≤ 1. Two situations are possible depending on the delay
of firm  (which firm  does not know).
(a)   0. Then the project will be delayed and hence the best decision for
firm  is  = 5. Its final payoﬀ will be 05.
(b)  = 0. If firm  chooses   1−  the project will be delayed. In that
case it is better to choose  = 5. Hence, the project will be delayed and
the utility of firm  will be 05.
If firm  chooses  ≤ 1−  the project will finish on time. The utility of
firm  will be 2 (1− )  2 (025) = 05.
Thus, the best decision for firm  is to choose  = 5.
3. Assume that  ≤ 075. Again, two situations are possible depending on the
delay of firm  (which firm  does not know).
(a)   0. Similarly to Case 2.(),  = 5 and firm  obtains 05.
(b)  = 0. If firm  chooses   1−  similarly to case 2.(),  = 05 and
firm  obtains 05.
If firm  chooses  ≤ 1 −  the project will finish on time. In that
case it is better to choose  = 1 − . Then the utility of firm  will be
2(1− ) ≥ 2(025) = 05.
Notice that the best decision for firm  depends on the decision of firm . If
  0 then the best decision is  = 5, but if  = 0 the best decision is
 = 1 − . Thus, firm  should think about what firm  will do and make
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its decision accordingly. This case is quite simple because for firm  the payoﬀ
from playing  = 0 is larger than the payoﬀ of any   0. Hence, firm  will
choose  = 1− .
We now analyze the behavior of firms  and . For firm   = 0 dominates any
  0, so firm  will always choose  = 0 under equilibria.
Firm  may anticipate that firm  will choose  = 0 and firm  will choose 
following the discussion above. If firm  chooses   075, then firm  will choose
 = 5, and firm  will obtain (2 − 19) ≤ 05. If firm  chooses  ≤ 075, then
firm  will choose  = 1−  and firm  will obtain 2. Thus, the best decision for
firm  is  = 075.
We argue that although there are many  in this example, rational firms will
play the  where in the equilibrium path,  = 0,  = 075, and  = 025, whose
vector of utilities for the firms is (0 15 05).
Both examples 6 and 7 show that when firms make their decisions they must care
about what decisions are made by firms that perform in parallel. In both examples
the good prediction is that of the case where firms believe that firms working in
parallel will not cause a delay unless it is profitable for them. In the next section we
formalize this idea and select the  that meet this condition.
3.2 Selecting equilibria in Stage 2
In this section we define the optimistic NE. Our idea is to select the  where
each firm behaves rationally in any information set when its beliefs are optimistic,
i.e. when each firm thinks that the other firms will not delay the project unless
it is profitable for them. Thus, we select the  that meet two conditions. The
first condition is related with the beliefs of the firms. By the time when a firm 
must make its decision there are other firms that have already made their decisions
(firm  in Example 1 with  = ); there are also other firms that will make their
decisions after firm  has completed its work (firm  in Example 1 if we consider
 = ); and still others that make their decisions while firm  is still performing and
therefore do not know the final delay of firm  (firm  in Example 1 with  = ). In
an optimistic  we assume that firm  believes that the firms in the third group
will not cause a delay unnecessarily (namely, these firms are trying to play an 
without delay when possible). The second condition is related to the ideas of the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (). We assume that each firm behaves
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rationally in any information set in accordance with its beliefs. In our case this
assumption is stronger than saying that agents play an  because, in general,
the unique subgame of the subgame obtained in Stage 2 is the whole subgame (see
for instance examples 6 and 7).
We now formalize this idea. Consider  ∈  and  = (  ()∈) an information
set of firm . Let () be the set of activities that perform in parallel with  at
time 6. Namely,
() = { ∈  \  : () ⊂ }
Note that  ∈ ().
We now define the vector of optimistic believes () ∈ R for firm  at
information set . We consider several cases:
1.  ∈ . Firm  knows the exact delay  of firm . Thus,
() = 
2.  ∈ ()\ {}. Firm  knows that firm  has started at time max∈∈Π
P
∈()
( + )
and that at time  firm  is still working. Thus, firm  has been working
− max∈∈Π
P
∈()
( + ) units of time.
Firm  believes firm  will not delay the project unless it is necessary for ob-
taining its minimal right. Thus, if  − max∈∈Π
P
∈()
( + )   + (),
then firm  believes the delay of firm  will be (). Otherwise, if  −
max∈∈Π
P
∈()
( + ) ≥  + (), then firm  believes firm  will finish
immediately. We model it by saying that  will finish in  units of time. Thus,
() = max
⎧
⎨
⎩() −  − max∈∈Π
X
∈()
( + ) + 
⎫
⎬
⎭ 
3.  ∈  \ { ∪ ()}. Note that in this case firm  has no information about
the delay of  because it has not started yet. So firm  believes firm  will not
delay the project at least it is necessary for obtaining its minimal right. Thus,
() = ()
6The set of activities in which firms are still performing at time .
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Let (() ) = max∈Π
(P
∈
()− 
)
where by convention () = (). If
(() )  0 for all   0 then the project will be delayed under each . If
(() ) ≤ 0 it is possible for firms to play an  without delays.
Remark 6 Given the information held by firm  at time , firm  thinks that the firms
that have not finished yet, including itself, will choose a delay equal to its minimal
right or will finish immediately. Actually, our results still hold if the beliefs of firm
 are modeled by a vector () in which the firms do not delay the project unless it
is necessary to do so to obtain their minimal right. Namely, () = () for all
 ∈ , () ≥ () when  ∈ , and (() ) ≤ 0 when (() ) ≤ 0.
Let Γ(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by (  ). Let  be the
penalty chosen by the planner at Stage 1. Consider  ∈  and  an information set
of agent . Let  = ()∈\(()∪{}) such that  =  for each  ∈ . We define the
game Γ(  ) as the game induced by Γ(  ) at information set  by assuming
that the set of firms is () ∪ {} and the rest of the firms  ∈  \ (() ∪ {})
have a fixed duration of  +  units of time (or a fixed delay of  units of time).
Note that in this game the first decision corresponds to firm .
Let us denote by () the restriction of () to  \ (() ∪ {}), namely,
() = (())∈\(()∪{}).
We say  = ()∈ is an optimistic  if it is an  and for any firm  and
any information set  we have that ()∪{} induces an  in Γ()(  ).
We now compute the set of optimistic  in Example 1 when  = 19. Let
 = (  ) be an information set of firm . We consider several cases.
1.   2. The project will be delayed for sure. Hence, () = 5.
2.  ≤ 2. Thus,  = {}, () = 0 = (19) and () = . Hence,
() =
½
5 if   075
1−  if  ≤ 075
Let  be the information set of firm . Since    and  is a critical activity,
() = 0. Note that () = () = (19) = (19) = 025.
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Let  be the information set of firm . For each decision  in , firm  knows the
decision of firm  under an optimistic . Hence, () = 075.
Thus, the vector of delays when firms play an optimistic  is (0 075 025) and
the utilities are (0 15 05).
Next we prove that there is a unique optimistic .
Proposition 3 Let Γ(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by (  ). For
any penalty  there exists a unique optimistic  in the subgame obtained in Stage
2.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first prove that there exists at least one optimistic
. Let  ∈  and let  be an information set of firm . Intuitively, the decision
of firm  is as follows: given its optimistic beliefs, if there is enough slack to give to
every firm its minimal right and   0, then firm  delays as long as possible, giving
the other firms their minimal right. Otherwise firm  delays  when    and 0
when  ≤ . Formally,
() =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
if   0 and (() ) ≤ 0 for some   0
 if    and  (() )  0 for all   0
0 if  = 0 or  ≤  and  ( ()  )  0 for all   0
(1)
Notice that when (() ) ≤ 0 for some   0 we have that
min∈∈Π
⎧
⎨
⎩  −
X
∈\{}
()
⎫
⎬
⎭ ≥ 0
Thus, () is well defined.
We now prove that  = ()∈ is an optimistic . Let  ∈  and  an
information set of firm . We assume that   0 (otherwise, by Remark 4, () = 0
is the best decision). Let 0() 6= (). By simplicity we write  (0) instead of ()
(0()). We make an abuse of notation and we identify the utility and strategies in
the games Γ(  ) and Γ()(  ). We distinguish two cases:
1. 0  . Thus,   . We consider two cases:
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(a)  = 0. Thus,  ≤  and  (() )  0 for all   0 This means that the
project will be delayed under . So
(()∪{} \ 0) = 0( − ) ≤ 0 = (()∪{})
(b) 0   = min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
 . Thus,   0 and (() ) ≤
0 for some   0Then, the project is not delayed under  and (()∪{}) =
.
We have that    ≥ () = (). By definition of , if firm 
increases its delay, the project will be delayed. Thus, (()∪{} \ 0) =
( − )0.
If  ≤ , then ( − )0 ≤ 0 ≤  If    then
( − )0 ≤ ( − ) = () ≤ 
2. 0  . Thus   0. We again consider two cases.
(a)  = ,    and  (() )  0 for all   0 Then, the project is
delayed under  and hence  ¡()∪{}¢ = ( − ). Two cases are
possible.
i. The project is also delayed under ()∪{} \ 0. Thus,
 ¡()∪{} \ 0¢ = ( − ) 0  ( − )
ii. The project is not delayed under ()∪{} \ 0 Since  (() )  0
for all   0 we have that 0  () = (). Thus,
 ¡()∪{} \ 0¢ = 0  () = ( − )
(b)  = min∈∈
(
  − P
∈\{}

)
   0 and (() ) ≤ 0 for some
  0. Then, the project is not delayed under  and (()∪{}) = .
Since 0   we know that the project is not delayed under ()∪{} \0.
Thus,
 ¡()∪{} \ 0¢ = 0  
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We now prove the uniqueness. We will prove that if  is an optimistic , then
 coincides with formula (1). Let  ∈  and  an information set of firm . If  = 0
by Remark 4, () = 0. Thus, we assume   0.
For each  ∈  let () denote the maximum number of activities in the largest
path from  until the end of the project. Namely,
() = max∈∈Π{|( )|}
We prove the uniqueness by backward induction on (). Assume that  is an
activity with () = 0. Then, () = ∅. Since  is the unique firm in the game
Γ()(  ) and  induces an  in Γ()(  ), we deduce that () is as in
formula (1).
Assume now that () = 1. Thus, for each  ∈ (), () = 0, and so these firms
behave according with . We consider several cases:
1. (() )  0 for all   0. Since ()∪{} is an  in Γ()(  ), the
project is delayed under ()∪{}. Thus,  ¡()∪{}¢ = ( − ) (). We
again consider two cases:
(a)  ≤ . If ()  0 then  ¡()∪{}¢  0. Since ()∪{} is an ,
we have that () = 0.
(b)   . Since ()∪{} is an , we have that () = .
2. (() ) ≤ 0 for some   0. Then, ()∪{} could be an  with or without
delay in Γ()(  ) Once  has finished, for each  ∈ () it is achieved
the information set . We consider several cases.
(a) () ≤ min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
 Then, (() ) ≤ 0 for some
  0 for each  ∈ (). Since () = 0, for each  ∈ (), we have
that () is as in formula (1). Thus, the project is not delayed and
hence, (()∪{}) = ().
In this case () = min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
is strictly better that
any ()  min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
.
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(b) ()  min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
. Then, there exists 0 such that
0− P
∈0\{}
()  () ≤ . Hence, there exists  ∈ () such that
(() )  0 for all   0. Since () = () and () = 0 when  ≤ 
we deduce that   . Since () = 0, () =  (as in formula (1)) and
the project is delayed. Hence, (()∪{}) = ( − )(). Since  is an
,    (otherwise 0() = 0 is better than ()). Then () =  is
strictly better than any ()  .
Since () ≤ min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
we have that
( − ) = () ≤  min∈∈Π
⎧
⎨
⎩  −
X
∈\{}
()
⎫
⎬
⎭ 
Now if ()  min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
 then firm  obtains more utility
delaying min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
than delaying  Since ()∪{} is an
 in Γ()(  ) we have that  () = min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)

If () = min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
then firm  obtains the same utility
delaying min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
than delaying  Since ()∪{} is an
 in Γ()(  ) and Remark 4, we have that () = min∈∈Π
(
  − P
∈\{}
()
)
.
Assume now that () = 2. If we proceed as in the previous case we obtain than
() is as in formula (1). By repeating this argument we can prove that () is as
in formula (1) for each  ∈  and each information set  of firm . ¥
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3.3 Equilibria in the whole game
Once we know how firms behave under equilibria when the planner announces the
penalty, the next step is to focus on the optimal decision for the planner. Our main
objective is to calculate the penalty under which the planner maximizes its utility.
To that end we assume that the firms play an in the subgame of Stage 2. In some
cases there is a unique  but in other cases there can be several . Thus, the
planner must predict which  will be played in Stage 2. The results shown in this
section hold under the assumption that in Stage 2 firms will play any optimal 
(see Proposition 2). In particular our results also hold when firms play the unique
optimistic  characterized in Proposition 3.
We start with a preliminary result.
Lemma 1 Let Γ(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by (  ). Assume
that for each penalty  firms play an optimal  in Stage 2. Then, there exists a
limit penalty ∗Γ such that
1. If   ∗Γ then the project will be delayed.
2. If  ≥ ∗Γ then the project will finish on time.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ( ) denote the sum of the minimal rights of the
firms in a path  when the penalty announced by the planner is . Namely,
( ) =X
∈
() =
X
∈:
( − )
 
Since  is a continuous strictly decreasing piecewise linear function in  from
(0 ) = P
∈:0
 till ( ) = 0 when  ≥ max∈ , there exists a unique 1 such
that (1 ) = .
By Proposition 1.1, if   1 for some  ∈ Π, then P∈ ()   and so the
project is delayed in any  at Stage 2. We define ∗Γ = max∈Π 1. Thus,
1. If   ∗Γ, then the project is delayed in any  in Stage 2.
2. If  ≥ ∗Γ, since the firms play an optimal  in Stage 2, by Proposition 1.2,
the project will finish on time. ¥
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Proposition 4 Let Γ(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by (  ). As-
sume that for each penalty  firms play an  () without delays (when there exists)
and the unique  with delays when there is not an  without delays in Stage 2.
Thus, sup {0( ()) :  ≥ 0} is achieved for some  ∈ {∗Γ {}∈ :∗Γ}.
Proof of Proposition 4.
If  ≥ ∗Γ, by Lemma 1, we know the project finishes on time. Then, the planner
gets 0.
If   ∗Γ, by Lemma 1, the project is delayed in any  () = (())∈ at
Stage 2. Let us make an abuse of notation and denote by () the delay in the
information set of firm  achieved when firms play (). By the proof of Proposition
1 the planner will obtain
0 ( ()) = 
X
∈
 ()− 
Ã
max∈Π
X
∈
(() + )− 
!
=  X
∈ :
 − 
Ã
max∈Π
Ã
() + X
∈:

!
− 
!

We decompose this utility in two parts:
 X
∈ :
 (2)

Ã
max
Ã
() + X
∈:

!
− 
!
 (3)
where (2) is the profit obtained from the penalties and (3) is the cost incurred by
the planner because of the delay in the project. Note that
• The profit (2) is a right-continuous piecewise linear function on the intervals
defined by {∗Γ { :   ∗Γ}}. Within each interval this function is strictly
increasing in .
If  ≥  for some  ∈  , firm  will choose () = 0 whereas () =  when
  . So (2) decreases when moving from one interval to the next. Thus,
the local supremum of (2) is achieved when  left converges to an element in
{∗Γ { :   ∗Γ}}.
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• The cost (3) is a decreasing piecewise constant function on the intervals given
by {∗Γ { :   ∗Γ}}. So, again, the changes in (3) are given when  ∈
{∗Γ { :   ∗Γ}}.
Thus, computing the strategy that will lead to a supremum in the planner’s utility
is straightforward. When  ≥ ∗Γ its utility will be 0 for sure.
When   ∗Γ we only need to calculate its utility function in {∗Γ { :   ∗Γ}}.
Note that we talk about the supremum (rather than the maximum) because it is
achieved when the penalty left converges to some  or to ∗Γ. ¥
Proposition 4 has two immediate consequences. From a theoretical point of view,
because of the proof of this proposition, the game Γ(  ) may not have . This
is because in our result we find conditions in order for the planner to obtain the
supremum of its utility. From a practical point of view we think that our results can
be used for predicting the behavior of rational agents. In our model the penalty  is a
real number. In the real world when agents decide about penalties, prices, etc. they
typically use natural numbers, which are a multiple of a small amount of money in
the relevant currency. For instance, if the currency is the Euros, prices are given as
an amount in Euro cents. If we consider a discrete version of our model where  and
 are natural numbers (interpreted as amounts in cents) the whole game has .
This corresponds to the case where the planner chooses 0− 1 where 0 is (according
to Proposition 4) the value at which sup {0( ()) :  ≥ 0} is achieved.
We now illustrate the results of Proposition 4 in some examples.
Example 8 Consider the project given by the following picture
where  = 6 and
activities   
 4 4 3
 5 3 5
 8 3 4
 6 4 6
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There are four paths: 1 = { }, 2 = { }, 3 = { }, and 4 = { }. The
PERT time is  = 13 and the vector of slacks of the paths is given by  = (1 3 0 2).
Besides, the limit penalty for each path is: 11 = 288, 12 = 25, 13 = 5, and14 = 3947. This means that a penalty as great or greater than ∗Γ = 5 is needed if
the planner wants the project to finish on time.
The next figure shows the shape of functions (2) and (3).
The next figure shows the utility (blue line) of the planner.
Note that the planner must choose a penalty lower than 5 to obtain a positive
payoﬀ. Moreover, the supremum utility is achieved when  left converges to 3. Thus,
the planner should choose a penalty a little lower than but very close to 3.
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We consider Example 3. The utility of the planner is given by
0 ( ()) =
½
30− 20 if   1
0 if  ≥ 1
Thus, the supremum is achieved when  left converges to 1. From a practical point
of view the prediction given by our results is that the planner will choose a penalty
a little below 1 and firms will delay by 10 units.
We consider Example 4. In this case 1{} = 24 and 1{} = 0. Thus, the utility
of the planner is given by
0 ( ()) =
½
10− 40 if   24
0 if  ≥ 24
Since 10 − 40  0 when   24, it emerges that the supremum is achieved when
 ≥ 24. In particular when  = 3 =  = . The prediction in this case is that
the planner will choose a penalty larger than 2.4 (for instance 3), firms  and  will
delay together by two units (the slack of the path { }) and the project will finish
on time. It is important to remark that the planner is indiﬀerent between penalties
 ≥ 24,but firms are not. For instance
 () ()  () 0 ( ())  ( ())  ( ())  ( ())
2.5 0 1.5 0.5 0 0 7.5 2.5
3 0 2 0 0 0 10 0
In this case, the larger  is, the best for firm  and the worst for firm .
4 Second case: penalties are applied to every de-
layed firm
Wemodel this situation with a non-cooperative game in extensive form with 3 stages,
as in the previous case. The first two stages are the same in both games but the
third stage is diﬀerent. In this case the planner always applies the penalty on paying
the firms, i.e. if a firm incurs a delay it will be always punished (no matter whether
the project is delayed or not). We conduct an analysis similar to the one for the first
case. We first analyze the equilibria in Stage 2 and then we analyze the equilibria of
the whole game. In this case most of the theoretical results are quite straightforward.
We first introduce the model formally. With each PERT problem with delays
(  ) we associate the non-cooperative game ∆(  ) where
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1. Stage 1. The planner decides the penalty  ∈ [0+∞).
2. Stage 2. The firms, following the structure of the project, decide the vector
of delays .
3. Stage 3. The planner pays the firms.
( ) =
( P
∈
 − ( ()−  ) if  = 0
( − ) if  ∈ 
Assume that in Example 1  = 3  = 0  = 2, and  = 3. Moreover, agents
play the following strategies  = 1,  = 0  = 05 and  = 05. Then,  () = 3.
The project is not delayed because  = 3 but delayed firms are punished anyway:
0( ) = 2 (05 + 05) = 2
( ) = 0
( ) = (2− 1)05 = 05
( ) = (3− 1) 05 = 1
4.1 Equilibria in Stage 2
In this section we characterize the set of  of ∆(  ) in the subgame obtained
in Stage 2. Basically, there is a unique  where firms with  ≤  do not delay and
firms with    delay as long as possible ().
Proposition 5 Let ∆(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by (  ). Let
 be the penalty chosen by the planner at Stage 1. Let  be such that for any firm 
and any information set  of firm  it holds that
() =
½
0 if  ≤ 
 if   
Thus,  is an  in the subgame obtained in Stage 2. Moreover, all  in the
subgame obtained in Stage 2 have the same utility outcome as .
Proof of Proposition 5. It is obvious that  is an .
Let, 0 be a profile of strategies. For each  ∈  , (0) = ( − )0.
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1. If  ≤ , then (0) ≤ 0 = ( 0−).
2. If   , then (0) ≤ ( − ) = ( 0−).
Now it is trivial to prove that all  in the subgame obtained in Stage 2 have
the same utility outcome as . ¥
4.2 Equilibria in the whole game
In this section we analyze the whole game under this new penalty system. We obtain
similar results to the previous case, but without making any kind of assumption as
to the behavior of firms in Stage 2. We only need to assume that firms will play an
.
We start with a preliminary result.
Lemma 2 Let ∆(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by (  ). Assume
that for each penalty  firms play an  in Stage 2. Then, there exists a limit
penalty ∗∆ such that
1. If   ∗∆ then the project will be delayed.
2. If  ≥ ∗∆ then the project will finish on time.
Besides, this penalty belongs to {}∈ and ∗∆ ≥ ∗Γ.
Proof of Lemma 2. Given a penalty , the delay of path  when the firms play
an  is given by P
∈:
.
For each path  such that P
∈:0
   we take 2 such that P∈:  
for each   2 and P∈: ≤  for each  ≥ 2 Obviously, 2 ∈ {}∈ 
For each path  such that P
∈:0
 ≤  we take 2 = 0
We define ∗∆ = max∈Π {2}.
1. If   ∗∆, then there exists  ∈ Π such that 0 ≤   2 Thus, P∈:  
Therefore, the project will be delayed.
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2. If  ≥ ∗∆, then for each  ∈ Π  ≥ 2 Thus, for each  ∈ Π P∈: ≤ 
and so the project will finish on time.
In Lemma 1 we have seen thatX
∈
(1) =
X
∈:1
(1) = 
Since () ≤  for all  ∈ R+, P
∈:1
 ≥ . Thus, 1 ≤ 2 and so∗Γ ≤ ∗∆. ¥
The main result of this subsection is the following.
Proposition 6 Let ∆(  ) be the non-cooperative game induced by (  ). As-
sume that for each penalty  firms play an () in Stage 2. Thus, sup {0 ( ()) :  ≥ 0}
is achieved for a  ∈ {}∈ .
Proof of Proposition 6. By Lemma 2,
1. If   ∗∆ the project will be delayed and the utility of the planner will be
0( ()) = 
X
∈ :
 − 
Ã
max∈Π
Ã
() + X
∈:

!
− 
!
 (4)
2. If  ≥ ∗∆ the project will finish on time. In this case we need to distinguish
two cases:
(a) If  ≥ max {}∈ , all the activities will play 0 and the utility of the
planner will be 0.
(b) If   max {}∈ , despite the project ends on time, the planner will ob-
tain some benefits through the penalties. Thus, 0( ()) =  P
∈ :
.
Note that the function that computes the benefit obtained from penalties and
the function that computes the cost incurred by the planner if the project is delayed
are the same as in Proposition 4. So, since the changes in both functions are given
when  ∈ {}∈ , the local supremum for the planner is achieved when the penalty left converges to a  ∈ {}∈ .¥
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The statements of Proposition 4 and Proposition 6 seem to be the same, but the
set of values that need to be checked in order to find the supremum diﬀers from one
model to the other. Moreover, the supremum may also be diﬀerent. Note that in
the present model the value ∗Γ plays no role whereas in the first case it is highly
important. For instance, given a penalty , if there is a firm  with ∗Γ    , in
the previous case the project will end on time, while in this case firm  will delay as
long as possible and the project could be delayed.
We clarify this issue with an example.
Consider the project in Example 8. If we compute the utility of the planner
under this second penalty system we obtain the following
Note that in this case the supremum is achieved when  = 6, whereas in the
previous case it is achieved when  = 3.
In the first case the utility of the planner is 6 and the delay in the project is also
6. In this case the utility of the planner is 12 and the delay in the project is 1.
In this example it seems better for the planner to apply the second penalty system
because it will obtain greater utility with less delay in the project. This raises the
question of whether this happens in general or only in some cases. In the next section
we compare the two cases.
5 Comparing both penalty systems
In this section we compare the results obtained from the two penalty systems (Γ(  )
and ∆(  )). We compare the utility of the planner, the utility of the firms and
the delay in the project under the two systems. We first study what happens in
Stage 2 and then analyze the whole game.
38
5.1 Comparing Stage 2
Given a penalty  we compare the equilibria of the subgame obtained in Stage 2
for both Γ(  ) and ∆(  ). Since there can be multiple  for Γ(  ),
we assume that firms will play an optimal  (see Proposition 2). In particular
our results also hold when firms play the unique optimistic  characterized in
Proposition 3. Our findings are:
1. The utilities of the planner in the two games are unrelated (in some cases utility
is greater in Γ(  ) and in other cases in ∆(  )).
2. The utility of the firms is as great or greater in Γ(  ).
This statement is quite intuitive because in Γ(  ) the penalty is applied
only when the whole project is delayed, whereas in ∆(  ) the penalty is
always applied.
3. The delay in the project is as long or longer in ∆(  ).
This statement seems a little counterintuitive because penalties are applied
more often in ∆(  ) than in Γ(  ). Nevertheless, it must be considered
that in Γ(  ) firms can delay their activities without being punished and
can achieve the same utility as when they are punished.
The above findings are formally proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Let (  ) be a  problem with delays and let  be any penalty.
Let Γ() be as follows. When there exists an  without delays in Stage 2 of
Γ(  ), let Γ() be some of the  given by Proposition 2. When there is not
an  without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ), let Γ() be some of the  given by
Proposition 1.1.
Let ∆() be some of the  in Stage 2 of ∆(  ) given by Proposition 5.
Let Γ and ∆ denote the utility functions of Γ(  ) and ∆(  ) respectively.
1. It is possible that Γ0 ( Γ())  ∆0 ( ∆()), Γ0 ( Γ())  ∆0 ( ∆()), andΓ0 ( Γ()) = ∆0 ( ∆()).
2. For each  ∈  , Γ ( Γ()) ≥ ∆ ( ∆()).
3.  (Γ()) ≤  (∆()).
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Proof of Proposition 7.
We first compute Γ(). We consider two cases.
• Assume that there exists an  without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ). By
Proposition 2, () ≤ Γ () ≤  for each  ∈  .
• Assume that there is no  without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ). By the
proof of Proposition 1.1,
Γ () =
½
0 if  ≤ 
 if   
We now compute ∆(). By Proposition 5,
∆ () =
½
0 if  ≤ 
 if   
We now prove the statement of the proposition.
1. Example 5. Let  = 2 and  = 5. Then, Γ0 ( Γ()) = 0 and ∆0 ( ∆()) = 3.
If we consider  = 6, then Γ0 ( Γ()) = 0 again, but ∆0 ( ∆()) = −2.
Example 3. Let  = 08 and  = 2. Then, Γ0 ( Γ()) = ∆0 ( ∆()) = 2.
2. Notice that
∆ ( ∆()) =
½
0 if  ≤ 
( − ) if   
We consider two cases.
• Assume that there exists an  without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ).
By Proposition 2,
Γ ( Γ()) ≥ () ≥
½
0 if  ≤ 
( − ) if   
• Assume that there is no  without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ). Since
Γ() = ∆() we have that for each  ∈  Γ ( Γ()) = ∆ ( ∆()).
3. Again we consider two cases.
• Assume that there exists an  without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ).
Thus,  (Γ()) =  ≤  (∆()).
• Assume that there is no  without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ). Since
Γ() = ∆() we have that  (Γ()) =  (∆()). ¥
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5.2 Comparing the whole game
We now compare the of Γ(  ) and∆(  ). Since for Γ(  ) there can be
multiple  in Stage 2, we assume firms will play any optimal  (see Proposition
2). In particular our results also hold when firms play the unique optimistic 
characterized in Proposition 3. Our findings are:
1. The optimal penalty for the planner is as great or greater in ∆(  ).
2. The utility of the planner is as great or grater in ∆(  ).
3. The utility of the firms is as great or greater in Γ(  ).
4. The delay in the project is unrelated.
For each project, the utility of each firm in Γ(  ) is as great or greater than
the utility of the firm in ∆(  ). Thus, firms clearly prefer Γ(  ).
For each project, the utility of the planner in ∆(  ) is as great or greater than
the utility of the planner in Γ(  ). This theoretical result requires a little more
clarification. Although it may suggest that the planner should always apply penalties
some clarifications are needed. It could be the case that the utility of the planner
is the same in both penalty systems. When the planner is a private institution this
may be irrelevant but when it is a public institution it makes sense for such a public
institution to apply the penalty only when the whole project is delayed if the utilities
of both penalty systems coincide. The reason is that firms are better oﬀ under this
penalty system, firms are part of society and the public institution represents society
7. Thus, for public institutions it makes sense to analyze each project separately and
then decide which penalty system to apply. If the utility of the planner is strictly
greater when penalties are always applied then it should choose that system, but if
the planner obtains the same utility then it should choose the other since firms will
be better oﬀ.
Assume that there is a set of agents (other than the planner and the firms) that
need the project to be completed. For instance the project could be the construction
of a new hospital, highway, etc. Those agents clearly want the project to be completed
as soon as possible, but in such a situation it is not clear which penalty system
(Γ(  ) or ∆(  )) is better.
The above findings are proved in the following proposition.
7For instance, if firms make more profit they will pay more tax and the funding available to the
public institution will be larger.
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Proposition 8 Let (  ) be a  problem with delays and  any penalty.
Let Γ() be as follows. When there are  without delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ),
Γ() is some of the  given by Proposition 2. When there is not an  without
delays in Stage 2 of Γ(  ), Γ() is some of the  given by Proposition 1.1.
Let ∆() be some of the  in Stage 2 of ∆(  ) given by Proposition 5.
Let Γ and ∆ denote the utilities functions of Γ(  ) and ∆(  ) respec-
tively. Then
1. Given
Γ = min© :  ∈ arg sup©Γ0 ( Γ()) :  ≥ 0ªª and
∆ = min© :  ∈ arg sup©∆0 ( ∆()) :  ≥ 0ªª 
we have that Γ ≤ ∆.
2. sup
©Γ0 ( Γ()) :  ≥ 0ª ≤ sup©∆0 ( ∆()) :  ≥ 0ª.
3. For each  ∈  Γ
¡Γ Γ(Γ)¢ ≥ ∆ ¡∆ ∆(∆)¢.
4. It is possible that  ¡Γ(Γ)¢   ¡∆ ¡∆¢¢   ¡Γ(Γ)¢ =  ¡∆(∆)¢, or
 ¡Γ(Γ)¢   ¡∆(∆)¢.
Proof of Proposition 8.
1. Two cases are possible.
(a) Γ  ∗Γ. By the proof of Proposition 4 the project is delayed under
(Γ Γ(Γ)). Since Γ() = ∆()when   ∗Γ, we have that Γ0
¡ Γ()¢ =
∆0
¡ ∆()¢ for any   ∗ Thus, Γ ≤ ∆.
(b) Γ = ∗Γ8. By the proof of Proposition 4 the project is not delayed under¡Γ Γ(Γ)¢. Hence Γ0 ¡Γ Γ ¡Γ¢¢ = 0 ≥ Γ0 ¡ Γ ()¢ for any   ∗Γ.
We know that Γ0
¡ Γ()¢ = ∆0 ¡ ∆()¢ for any   ∗Γ Given 0 =
max{ :  ∈ } we have that ∆0
¡0 ∆ (0)¢ = 0 Then, ∗Γ ≤ ∆ ≤ 0.
2. Two cases are possible.
(a) Γ  ∗Γ. We have seen that Γ() = ∆() when   ∗Γ. Then,Γ0
¡ Γ()¢ = ∆0 ¡ ∆()¢ for any   ∗Γ and hence the result holds.
8Note that the case Γ  ∗Γ is not possible because Γ is the minimum.
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(b) Γ = ∗Γ. We have seen that sup
©Γ0 ¡ Γ()¢ :  ≥ 0ª = 0. Since∆0 ¡0 ∆(0)¢ = 0 when 0 = max{ :  ∈ }, the result holds.
3. Two cases are possible.
By the proof of Proposition 5 we have that
∆
¡∆ ∆(∆)¢ = ½ 0 if   ∆¡ − ∆¢ if  ≥ ∆
(a) Γ  ∗Γ. By the proof of Proposition 1 we have that
Γ
¡Γ Γ(Γ)¢ = ½ 0 if   Γ¡ − Γ¢ if  ≥ Γ
Since Γ ≤ ∆ the result holds.
(b) Γ = ∗Γ. By Proposition 2 we have that
Γ
¡Γ Γ(Γ)¢ ≥ () ≥ ½ 0 if   Γ¡ − Γ¢ if  ≥ Γ
Since Γ ≤ ∆ the result holds.
4. In Example 8. we have that  ¡Γ(Γ)¢ = 6  2 =  ¡∆(∆)¢.
In Example 3 we have that  ¡Γ(Γ)¢ = 10 =  ¡∆(∆)¢.
Consider the project given by Example 3 where  = 2 and
activities   
 10 5 0
 10 5 0
 7 5 3
Then  ¡Γ(Γ)¢ = 0  2 =  ¡∆(∆)¢. ¥
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6 Concluding Remarks
If we consider the results obtained in the paper, we can conclude that the Spanish
law does not address the problem of delays in the projects in a proper way. Al-
though a penalty clause explicitly appears in the contracts in order to encourage
firms to behave right and not delay their activities, this penalty is a fixed amount
that depends on the total cost estimate of the project. Thus, the planner, the public
administration in this case, can not change the value of the penalty that may be
insuﬃcient to avoid an excessive delay. In comparison the liquidated damages clause
in the General Conditions for Construction Contracts - Public Housing programs or
the clause suggested by the American Institute of Architects do provide the option of
fixing whatever penalty the planner decides, but this penalty can not be excessive. If
that is the case the liquidated damages clause, which is lawful, might be considered
a penalty clause, which is illegal.
There are situations in which a public organization wants to complete a project
and each activity involved in the project is allocated to one firm. That firm outsources
to third parties to complete the various activities in the project. This is standard
practice in the information technology and construction sectors. Such cases can be
included in our model if the planner is considered to be the firm and the public
organization does not explicitly appear in the model. In such a case  is the cost
per unit of delay that the planner must pay to the public organization if the project
is delayed. In these circumstances the public organization cares about the comple-
tion time of the project. Since a delay in the project is unrelated in Γ(  ) and
∆(  ), it is not clear which penalty system is better for the public organization.
We assume that the planner does not cancel any contracts with any firm because
of excessive delays. Such a situation is quite unusual, at least in the public sector,
but it sometimes happens. This situation is not covered by our model 9.
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